让我们来看一下休克疗法之父、萨克森本人对这件事情是怎样看待的吧。他本人是亲历这件事情的全部过程的，他的话应该算是比较有说服力的。
他这篇名为《Viewpoint: Why the shadow of WW1 and 1989 hangs over world events》的文章于2014年12月16日发表在BBC上，中文翻译为《1914重临:休克疗法之父谈今日俄罗斯》。
话不多说，直接上文章。
今年是两个重大地缘政治事件的周年纪念：第一次世界大战于一百年前爆发，深远地改变了人类历史进程;二十五年前柏林墙的倒塌，则为苏联帝国暴毙和冷战结束埋下伏笔。
而我们沉重地发现，它们的意义绝不止于纪念。
正如福克纳所说："过去从不消亡，甚至不曾过去"，一战和柏林墙的倒塌直到今天仍在影响着世界：叙利亚和伊拉克的烽火是一战结束的政治遗产;而在1989年的阴影笼罩下，乌克兰局势动荡。
1914年和1989年是历史的"关键时刻"，是决定性的转折点。大国小国都无法独善其身，它们在此时的表现将决定其未来的命运：战争或和平，崛起或衰败。
我作为经济顾问亲身参与了1989年的一系列事件，坦白说，那时我不住地担忧1914年重演。结果是，我看到波兰走出衰败，也看到俄罗斯陷入历史的泥淖。
一战即将结束的1919年，伟大的英国经济学家凯恩斯曾向世人阐述对"关键时刻"的见解，字字珠玉、历久弥新。他告诉我们战胜国的决定会如何彻底改变战败国的经济体系，也告诉我们大人物的失策会如何让战祸重现。
在其辞藻华美、洞见卓越的巨著《和约的经济后果》中，凯恩斯做出了精准的预言：凡尔赛和约的犬儒与短视，特别是对德国强加惩罚性战争赔款和对债务国金融危机恶化不管不顾，注定让欧洲经济走向持续的危机，也注定让一个满怀复 天才们流露的某些灵光是可以跨越代际的，凯恩斯在1919年的哀鸣无疑属于此类。在我担任政策顾问和分析师的那些岁月里，这本书的卓见成为我思路的框架。
三十年前，我作为一个初出茅庐的经济学家被临时起用，负责帮助玻利维亚这个几乎被遗忘的小国从大崩溃中走出来。凯恩斯的著作启示我在社会和政治层面考量玻利维亚的经济危机，而它的债务国美国，也应对其负起责任。
鉴于我在玻利维亚的工作经历，1989年春天，波兰朝野双方——末任共产党政府和团结工会都向我发出了邀请。当时的波兰，和玻利维亚一样，已陷入财政破产;而当时的欧洲，和1919年的欧洲一样，已走入历史的"关键时刻"。
彼时主政苏联的戈尔巴乔夫预见到欧洲将会在和平与民主之下重新团结起来，这位伟大人物同样希望民主制度能在自己国家落地生根。
在关键的1989年，波兰是第一个开启民主化进程的东欧国家。我在波兰新一届政府甫成立之时担任其主要外部经济顾问。我坚定主张合理的国际援助对波兰平稳顺利转型至后共产主义民主体制至关重要，亦是脱胎于凯恩斯思想。
我向白宫、唐宁街十号、爱丽舍宫和德国总理府发出了呼吁：请明智地选择援助波兰，这是构建民主团结新欧洲的关键一步。
那段日子，作为经济顾问的我可谓意气风发。
很多时候，我都在指望着白宫的决策。1989年9月的一个早上，我为波兰的货币稳定问题向美国政府申请十亿美元援助，当天晚上白宫就批准了这笔钱。不是开玩笑，从申请到批准来回一共八个小时。而说服白宫大幅减免波兰的债务稍微多花了点时间——高层间的谈判拉扯了一年左右。上述两者都被证明卓有成效。
其余的，便是大家熟知的历史了：波兰推行了一系列非常重大的改革——我参与设计了部分决策，而美国与欧洲用及时而慷慨的援助支持这些改革措施——波兰的经济开始重建与复苏。十五年以后，波兰成长为成熟的欧盟成员。
我多希望能把追忆停在这个美好的结局上，但是很可惜，西方在终结冷战时的表现并不纯是成功的。他们对波兰的举措是成功的，而对俄罗斯的举措则是巨大的失败。美国和欧洲慷慨而富有远见地帮助波兰，而对解体后的俄罗斯却再版了凡尔赛的可怕错误——我们今天正在为此付出代价。
1990年和1991年，戈尔巴乔夫政府注意到了波兰表现出来的积极迹象，邀请我协助其推行经济改革。那时俄罗斯面临着与1985年的玻利维亚和1989年的波兰相同的经济灾难。
1991年春天，我与哈佛和麻省理工的同事协助戈尔巴乔夫向西方国家请求经济援助，这是他所尝试政治改革和经济整顿的重要步骤。然而我们的努力落空了，确切地说是彻底失败了。
1991年夏天，当戈尔巴乔夫从G7峰会空手而归时，等待他是一场阴谋政变，其政治生涯就此终结。叶利钦上位后，苏联解体被摆到了台面上。
叶利钦的经济团队也向我请求帮助，既为了咨询维持经济的技术问题，亦为了从美国和欧洲获得至关重要的经济援助。
我告诉叶利钦总统和他的团队：援助很快就会来。毕竟对波兰的紧急援助都是在几周甚至几小时内到位的，对一个独立民主的新俄罗斯也理应会如此。然而事态发展让我愈渐迷惑，继而惊恐地发现——急需的援助并没有来。
波兰获得了债务减免，俄罗斯却面临着美国和欧洲的全额催债。波兰得到了及时而慷慨的经济援助，俄罗斯却只接到几批国际货币基金组织的专家团。我一再恳求美国多做些实事，强调在波兰的成功经验，都没有用，美国政府没有让步。
最终，俄罗斯经济崩盘碾碎了一切试图稳定和改革的努力，叶利钦政府失去了尊严也失去了权力。两年的无功忙碌后，我辞职了。再过几年，普京政府上台。
对于这场大崩溃，美国学术权威更多地批评俄罗斯的改革者而不是美国和欧洲的残忍忽视。诚然，历史是由胜利者书写的。美国很自然地把自己看作冷战的胜利者，也很自然地认为1991年后俄罗斯的不幸与己无关，直到今天依然如此。
我花了二十年时间，想了很多，读了很多，慢慢明白为什么当时美国对于波兰事务如此高瞻远瞩，对俄罗斯却残忍地忽视：西方世界之所以在经济和外交上如此提携波兰，是因为它能变成北约在东欧扩张的桥头堡，波兰是西方阵营的一员，因此是值得帮助的;而美国的领导人看待俄罗斯，正如劳埃德乔治和克莱蒙梭在凡尔赛看待德国一样——被击败的敌人就应该被碾过，何谈帮助?
北约前司令官韦斯利克拉克在最近出版的书里提到，1991年，时任五角大楼政策主管保罗沃尔夫沃兹对他说：没有了俄罗斯的干涉威胁，美国现在可以在中东随心所欲地行动了，在别的地方似乎也是一样。
简单来说，美国表现得像个得势霸主，不惜以战争手段保住冷战的胜利果实。美国将统驭群雄，俄罗斯将无力阻拦。
普京最近在莫斯科的一场演讲中，如沃尔夫沃兹一样形容美国的行为："冷战结束了，但我们并没有签订一份清晰透明的和约，一份尊重既有规则或创造了新的规则和标准的和约。相反它让所谓的冷战胜利者要求世界适应他们的利益。
我并不是试图为普京对俄罗斯最近在乌克兰非法、偏激和危险的暴力行为应负的责任开脱。我是想去解释它。1989年的阴云正笼罩我们、愈渐浓重。而北约最近又接受了乌克兰的加盟，将势力范围推至俄罗斯的边境，这是非常不明智的挑衅行为。
1914、1989、2014，我们正在见证历史——在乌克兰，我们看到俄罗斯对1991年后北约扩张和美国欺凌的积怨;在中东，我们看到一战中被摧毁的奥斯曼帝国的废墟上，生长着对欧洲殖民统治和美国帝国做派的愤恨，
最重要的是，我们面对着我们自己的时代选择。
我们要不要自私地使用力量?用力量来控制?相信领土、北约扩张、石油和其他战利品是对力量的奖赏?
还是负责任地使用力量，谨记慷慨与仁慈才能构建信任与繁荣——在此前提下才有和平可言?
This has been a year of great geopolitical anniversaries. We are at the 100th anniversary of the start of World War One, an event that more than any other shaped world history during the past century. We are at the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the opening chapter of the demise of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War. Yet we know that painfully we observe something far more than a mere remembrance.
As William Faulkner remarked, "The past is never dead. It's not even past." WW1 and the fall of the Wall continue to shape our most urgent realities today. The wars in Syria and Iraq are the legacy of the closure of WW1, and dramatic events in Ukraine are unfolding in the long shadow of 1989.
1914 and 1989 are "hinge moments", decisive points of history on which subsequent events turn. How nations both great and small behave at such hinge moments determine the future course of war and peace.
I participated directly and personally in the events of 1989, and saw this lesson in play - positively in the case of Poland and negatively in the case of Russia. And I can tell you that as I carried out my own tasks as an economic adviser during 1989-92, I kept a constant and always worried gaze on 1914. I carry that same sense of worry today.
In 1919, at the end of WW1, the great British economist John Maynard Keynes taught us invaluable and lasting lessons about such hinge moments, how decisions of victors impact the economies of the vanquished, and how missteps by the powerful can set the course of future wars.
With uncanny insight, prescience, and literary flair, Keynes's 1919 The Economic Consequences of the Peace predicted that the cynicism and shortsightedness at the core of the Versailles Treaty, especially the imposition of punitive war reparations on Germany, and the lack of solutions to the roiling financial crises of the debtor countries, would condemn the European economies to continuing crisis, and would in fact invite the rise of another vengeful tyrant in the coming generation.
Keynes's cri de coeur is one of those remarkable outpourings of genius that speaks across generations. That book and its lessons proved to be a formative guide for me in my own career as policy adviser and analyst.
As a newly minted economist some 30 years ago, I suddenly found myself charged with helping a small and largely forgotten country, Bolivia, to find a way out of its own unmitigated economic disaster. Keynes's writings helped me to understand that Bolivia's financial crisis should be viewed in social and political terms, and that Bolivia's creditor, the US, had a shared responsibility of resolving Bolivia's financial anguish.
My experience in Bolivia in 1985-86 soon brought me to Poland in the spring of 1989, at a dual invitation of Poland's final communist government and the Solidarity trade union movement that strongly opposed it. Poland, like Bolivia, was financially bankrupt. And Europe in 1989, like Europe in 1919, was at a great hinge-moment of history.
Mikhail Gorbachev was in power in the Soviet Union, and was prepared to see Europe reunited in peace and democracy. This great man desired similarly to move his own country to a new democratic order. Poland was the first country in the region to move towards democracy in that momentous year. I quickly became the main outside economic adviser to the new Polish government. Once again, drawing from Keynes, I championed the kind of international assistance that I felt to be vital for Poland to make a peaceful and successful transition to post-communist democratic rule.
Specifically, I appealed to the White House, 10 Downing Street, the Elysee and the German Chancellery, for enlightened aid to Poland as a key step in building a new united and democratic Europe.
These were heady days for me as an economic adviser. My wish, it seemed on some days, was the White House's command. One morning, in September 1989, I appealed to the US Government for $1bn for Poland's currency stabilisation. By evening, the White House confirmed the money. No kidding, an eight-hour turnaround time from request to result. Convincing the White House to support a sharp cancellation of Poland's debts took a bit longer, with high-level negotiations stretching out for about a year, but those too proved to be successful.
The rest, as they say, is history. Poland undertook very strong reform measures, based in part on recommendations that I had helped to design. The US and Europe supported those measures with timely and generous aid. Poland's economy began to restructure and grow, and 15 years later it became a full-fledged member of the European Union
I wish that I could stop my reminiscing here, with this happy story. But alas, the story of the end of the Cold War is not only one of Western successes, as in Poland, but also one of great Western failure vis-a-vis Russia. While American and European generosity and the long view prevailed in Poland, American and European actions vis-a-vis post-Soviet Russia looks were much more like the horrendous blunders of Versailles. And we are paying the consequences to this day.
In 1990 and 1991, Gorbachev's government, seeing the emerging positive results in Poland, asked me to help advise it on economic reforms. Russia at the time was facing the same kind of financial calamity that had engulfed Bolivia in the mid-1980s and Poland by 1989.
In the spring of 1991, I worked with colleagues at Harvard and MIT to assist Gorbachev to obtain financial support from the West as part of his efforts at political reform and economic overhaul. Yet our efforts fell flat - indeed they failed entirely.
Gorbachev left the G7 summit that summer of 1991 and returned to Moscow empty-handed. When he returned to Moscow with no results, a conspiracy attempted to oust him in the notorious August Putsch, from which he never recovered politically. With Boris Yeltsin ascendant, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union now on the table, Yeltsin's economic team again asked me for assistance, both in the technical challenges of stabilisation, and in the quest to obtain vital financial assistance from the US and Europe.
I predicted to President Yeltsin and his team that help would soon be on the way. After all, emergency help for Poland was arranged in hours or weeks. Surely the same would happen for the newly independent and democratic Russia. Yet I watched in puzzlement and growing horror that the needed aid was not on the way.
Where Poland had been granted debt relief, Russia instead faced harsh demands by the US and Europe to keep paying its debts in full. Where Poland had been granted rapid and generous financial aid, Russia received study groups from the IMF but no money. I begged and beseeched the US to do more. I pleaded the lessons of Poland, but all to no avail. The US government would not budge.
In the end, Russia's malignant financial crisis overwhelmed the efforts at reform and normality. The reform government of Yegor Gaidar fell from grace and from power. I resigned after two hard years of trying to help, and of accomplishing very little indeed. A few years later, Vladimir Putin replaced Yeltsin at the helm.
Throughout this debacle, the US pundits blamed the reformers rather than the cruel neglect by the US and Europe. Victors write the history, as they say, and the US felt very much the victor of the Cold War. The US would therefore remain blameless in any accounts of Russia's mishaps after 1991, and that remains true today.
It took me 20 years to gain a proper understanding of what had happened after 1991. Why had the US, which had behaved with such wisdom and foresight in Poland, acted with such cruel neglect in the case of Russia? Step by step, and memoir by memoir, the true story came to light. The West had helped Poland financially and diplomatically because Poland would become the Eastern ramparts of an expanding Nato. Poland was the West, and was therefore worthy of help. Russia, by contrast, was viewed by US leaders roughly the same way that Lloyd George and Clemenceau had viewed Germany at Versailles - as a defeated enemy worthy to be crushed, not helped.
A recent book by a former Nato commander, General Wesley Clark, recounts a 1991 conversation he had with Paul Wolfowitz, who was then the Pentagon's policy director. Wolfowitz told Clark that the US had learned that it could now act with impunity in the Middle East, and ostensibly in other regions as well, without any threat of Russian interference.
In short, the US would behave like a victor and a bully, claiming the fruits of Cold War victory through wars of choice if necessary. The US would be on top, and Russia would be unable to stop it.
In a recent speech in Moscow, Putin has described US behaviour in almost the same terms as Wolfowitz. "The Cold War ended," said Putin, "but it did not end with the signing of a peace treaty with clear and transparent agreements on respecting existing rules or creating new rules and standards. This created the impression that the so-called 'victors' in the Cold War had decided to pressure events and reshape the world to suit their own needs and interests."
By making these observations I do not mean to exonerate Putin of responsibility for Russia's recent illegal, cynical, and dangerous acts of violence in Ukraine. But I do mean to help explain them. The shadow of 1989 looms large. And Nato's continued desire, expressed again just recently, to add Ukraine to its membership, thereby putting Nato right up on the Russian border, must be regarded as profoundly unwise and provocative.
1914, 1989, 2014. We live in history. In Ukraine, we face a Russia embittered over the spread of Nato and by US bullying since 1991. In the Middle East, we face the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, destroyed by WW1, and replaced by the cynicism of European colonial rule and US imperial pretentions.
We face, most importantly, choices for our time. Will we use power cynically and to dominate, believing that territory, Nato's long reach, oil reserves, and other booty are the rewards of power? Or will we exercise power responsibly, knowing that generosity and beneficence builds trust, prosperity, and the groundwork for peace? In each generation, the choice must be made anew.
